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Rethinking Optimality in Tort Litigation: The Promise of 
Reverse Cost-Shifting 
 
Jonathan Fischbach & Michael Fischbach∗
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Of all the known methods of redressing grievances and settling 
disputes—pitched battle, rioting, dueling, mediating, flipping a 
coin, suing—only the latter has steadily won the day in the 
United States. 
- Jethro K. Lieberman, The Litigious Society1
 
Over the past two decades, policymakers sought to stem the 
destructive social effects of the “litigation explosion”2 by developing 
alternatives to the familiar “American Rule” of fee-shifting. Fee-shifting 
rules offered a promising avenue of reform. Prevailing economic wisdom 
held that parties weighed the anticipated benefits and costs of litigating 
when determining whether to settle or go to court.3 Hence, rules that 
shifted liability for attorneys’ fees between parties invariably influenced 
litigation patterns. This power of fee-shifting rules to alter litigation 
behavior was manifest in the Congressional practice of attaching fee-
shifting provisions to statutes establishing important federal rights.4 In 
recent times, state politicians have also hoisted the banner of reform, 
experimenting with similar rules that shift fees to the “prevailing party” 
∗ Jonathan D. Fischbach received an A.B. from Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International 
Affairs of Princeton University in 1998 and later received a J.D. from Cornell Law School in 2002. 
After serving a clerkship with The Honorable Kermit V. Lipez at United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit from 2004-05, Jonathan now practices as an associate in the Antitrust and Trade 
Regulation Group of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Michael Fischbach 
received his A.B. from Harvard University in 2003 and is currently a candidate for a Ph.D. from the 
Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology, Harvard University. The authors are grateful to 
Max Gulker and Ephraim Fischbach for helpful suggestions and a critical reading of the manuscript. 
 1. JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY xi (1981) 
 2. See generally WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN 
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 152 (1991). 
 3. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities 
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 501-02 (1991); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 
Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067 (1989). 
 4. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 396 (1969); 2 U.S.C. § 1219(3)(d) (1969); 5 U.S.C. § 552b(i) 
(1976); 10 U.S.C. § 1089(f)(2) (1976); 12 U.S.C. § 1701q-1(f) (1959). 
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in certain classes of civil disputes.5
The objective of state legislators was to develop a “hybrid” fee-
shifting rule that eliminated the major flaws of the two dominant fee-
shifting paradigms: the American Rule and the British Rule.6 Critics 
argued that the American Rule, which holds each party responsible for its 
own legal costs regardless of the outcome, offered few disincentives for 
filing frivolous lawsuits. The British Rule, which requires the losing 
party in a civil litigation to pay the winning party’s attorney’s fees, was 
disparaged for discouraging plaintiffs with small but meritorious claims 
from pursuing redress in the courts. 
However, two recent trends have impeded the success of efforts to 
develop a hybrid fee-shifting scheme by combining elements of both the 
American and British Rules. First, legislators in many states, insensitive 
to the divergent aims of state tort litigation and cases to enforce federal 
statutory rights, have imported boilerplate fee-shifting language from 
federal statutes into lawsuits governing state litigation practices. The 
insertion of federal fee-shifting provisions into state statutes has 
introduced uncertainty into the calculation and awarding of attorney’s 
fees, and imposed unwarranted “settlement surpluses” for plaintiffs 
resolving their grievances prior to trial.7
The failure of state legislators to formulate fee-shifting rules with 
 5. In theory, fee-shifting is not the only means of manipulating the volume of tort litigation. 
Most states provide common law remedies for filing frivolous lawsuits through the torts of malicious 
civil prosecution and abuse of process, see generally W. PAGE KEETON et al., THE LAW OF TORTS 
889-96 (5th ed. 1984), and all states enforce the analogue of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See Gerald F. Hess, Rule 11 Practice in Federal and State Court: An Empirical, 
Comparative Study, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 313 (1992). Finally, some states recognize an inherent power 
of the court to provide limited exceptions to the American Rule. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 
U.S. 32 (1991). However, none of these mechanisms are a proper surrogate for a fee-shifting rule 
with general application in civil cases. An action for malicious prosecution or abuse of process is 
available only if a victorious defendant can prove that the plaintiff litigated maliciously or with an 
ulterior motive, a prohibitively difficult burden to satisfy. See Scott S. Partridge et al., A Complaint 
Based on Rumors: Countering Frivolous Litigation, 31 LOY. L. REV. 221, 250 (1987). Civil 
procedure scholars have pronounced Rule 11 “functionally dead” in the wake of recent revisions, see 
Cynthia A. Leiferman, The 1993 Rule 11 Amendments: The Transformation of the Venomous Viper 
into the Toothless Tiger?, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 497, 498 (1994), and the states that permit judges to 
use inherent powers to deviate from the American Rule sharply restrict the exercise of this authority. 
Even in their heyday, these civil remedies only deterred patently meritless litigation. See, e.g., 
Crowely v. Katleman, 881 P.2d 1083, 1094-95 (Cal. 1994); In re Estate of Keeven, 882 P.2d 457, 
465 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); Hearity v. Iowa Dist. Court, 440 N.W.2d 860, 863 (Iowa 1989); 
Goodover v. Lindey’s Inc., 843 P.2d 765, 775-76 (Mont. 1992); Lannon v. Lee Conner Realty Corp., 
385 S.E.2d 380, 383 (Va. 1989). 
 6. See Robert V. Percival & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public 
Interest Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 233 (describing the history and 
theory of fee-shifting). 
 7. See Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply with the Law, 46 VAND. L. 
REV. 1069, 1084-85 (1993) (noting that bluffing by parties trying to capture a larger portion of the 
settlement surplus can lead to negotiation failures) (hereinafter Hylton I). 
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predictable, even-handed application sparked a second disturbing trend: 
statutory interference with judicial processes to limit or preclude damage 
recovery by tort victims. In recent years, commercial defendants have 
exerted substantial pressure on politicians for litigation relief in the form 
of caps on compensatory and punitive damage awards8 and broad grants 
of legal immunity.9
Such initiatives introduce unseemly inequities in the judicial process. 
If two plaintiffs suffer severe injuries of equal magnitude, their available 
remedies should not differ simply because one defendant is a doctor 
defending a medical malpractice suit and the other a wealthy car owner 
in a common negligence action. Even with respect to punitive damage 
awards (among the heavily criticized features of the tort system) the 
notion that industries with political capital can statutorily evade remedies 
designed to deter outrageous conduct is unsettling. This politicization of 
the remedial process creates an appearance of insensitivity toward 
injured plaintiffs and threatens to produce a patchwork remedial scheme 
across the spectrum of tortious injury with no principled basis in 
common law or common experience. 
The reality, however, is that doctors, gun manufacturers, and other 
common tort defendants will continue to flex their political muscle and 
employ brinksmanship tactics10 until the tort system demonstrates its 
capacity to consistently correlate actual outcomes with perceived legal 
merit. This Article adopts the premise that fee-shifting rules remain the 
most reliable means of inducing such reform across the tort system as a 
whole. Specifically, this article proposes that the Reverse-Cost Shifting 
(“RCS”) Rule11 provides a unique incentive structure that holds the 
greatest promise for soothing the social tremors of the litigation 
explosion. 
This thesis is presented in six parts. Part II briefly examines the ideal 
features of a hybrid fee-shifting rule. Part III discusses the importance of 
fee-shifting notwithstanding the views of some scholars that the ill 
effects of the “litigation explosion” are overblown. Part IV presents the 
American Rule and the British Rule and illustrates how each rule in its 
purest form diverges from the ideal. Part V surveys prior efforts of state 
legislators to merge elements of the two original rules into a hybrid fee-
 8. See Meredith Matheson Thoms, Comment, Punitive Damages in Texas: Examining the 
Need for a Split-Recovery Statute, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 207, 208 (2003). 
 9. See Carl Hulse, Senate Rejects Effort to Protect Gun Makers and Dealers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 2, 2004, at A1. 
 10. See Frank J. Vandall, Constricting Products Liability: Reforms in Theory and Procedure, 
48 VILL. L. REV. 843, 858 (2003). 
 11. Ephraim Fischbach & William McLauchlan, Reverse-Cost Shifting: A New Proposal for 
Allocating Legal Expenses, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 35 (1998). 
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shifting scheme and analyzes the consequences of their misguided 
incorporation of federal fee-shifting language into state law. Finally, Part 
VI reintroduces the Reverse-Cost Shifting (RCS) Rule, and empirically 
demonstrates the advantages of this Rule using a game theory model. 
 
II.  THE ELEMENTS OF AN IDEAL FEE-SHIFTING RULE 
 
On a micro-judicial level, the function of tort litigation is to restore 
both parties as nearly as possible to the position they occupied prior to 
the defendant’s violation of legal norms.12 The parties operate under the 
legal fiction that the defendant improperly benefited from his tortious 
behavior at the plaintiff’s expense and is, therefore, liable for monetary 
damages sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for her resulting injuries. 
The ideal fee-shifting rule would encourage every wronged plaintiff to 
pursue an appropriate remedy no matter how small the claim but ensure 
that plaintiffs do not extract a financial windfall that exceeds the 
magnitude of their injuries. 
As a rule, protracted litigation imposes financial and emotional 
burdens that move both parties further from their pre-incident positions 
as the trial progresses. Hence, an ideal fee-shifting rule would also 
minimize the “transaction costs” of dispute resolution by providing both 
parties with equally strong incentives to agree on an appropriate remedy 
outside of court, or alternatively, to settle at an early stage in the 
litigation. However, many hybrid fee-shifting rules diverge from this 
ideal by imposing “one-way” fee shifts to prevailing plaintiffs only, 
thereby encouraging plaintiffs to file questionable lawsuits and 
discouraging them from settling for an amount that fairly reflects their 
injuries.13
The structure of an ideal fee-shifting rule is also informed by macro-
level concerns, including the efficiency of the judicial process, incentives 
to conform behavior to legal rules, and the secondary social effects of 
litigious behavior. If injured plaintiffs with small damage claims are 
systematically deterred from prosecuting those claims (particularly when 
they are not amenable to class disposition), tortfeasors have reduced 
incentives to comply with legal mandates. The efficiency of the judicial 
process is also a function of how parties react to uncertainty in legal 
rules—a problem endemic to any system of administering justice. As 
 12. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and 
Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 909-10 (1989) (“There is universal agreement that the 
compensatory goal of tort law requires making the successful plaintiff ‘whole. . . .’”). 
 13. See Susan M. Olson, How Much Access to Justice from State “Equal Access to Justice 
Acts”?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 547, 556-57 (1995). 
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discussed below, the American Rule, the British Rule and prevalent 
hybrids of the two rules encourage parties to “litigate to the hilt” in the 
absence of clear, controlling legal precedent. While such behavior is 
beneficial if it contributes to development in nascent areas of the law, its 
utility is limited in tort. Consequently, an ideal fee-shifting rule would 
discourage parties from exploiting uncertainty in the law through pitched 
legal battle, and promote extra-judicial means of dispute resolution. 
Finally, the social costs of America’s litigious impulse—which range 
from playgrounds stripped of equipment to exorbitant medical care 
costs14—are a direct consequence of America’s preference for resolving 
tort cases in court.15 A fee-shifting rule that discourages parties from 
defaulting to the courts as an arbiter of civil disputes will significantly 
alleviate the forces that artificially inflate the price and decrease the 
availability of commodities that contribute to the quality and 
convenience of everyday life. 
These macro- and micro-level fee-shifting ideals can be distilled into 
a single principle: the ideal fee-shifting rule is one that tilts the litigation 
“playing field” along a single axis—the axis of merit. It would not 
unduly discourage the litigation of small claims but would discourage 
plaintiffs from carrying weak claims to a jury. It would reduce the 
potential for irrational jury verdicts or excessive awards by imposing 
substantial financial risk on parties who decline to settle their cases 
before judgment. In short, it would instigate a sea change in the 
administration of the tort system by replacing litigation with settlement 
as the primary remedial avenue for plaintiffs. 
 
III.  FEE-SHIFTING AS A MEANS OF CONTAINING THE “VERDICT 
EXPLOSION” 
 
A sizeable volume of scholarly work empirically challenges the 
magnitude of the litigation explosion, concluding that the volume of 
cases litigated today does not diverge substantially from earlier periods.16 
Without commenting on the validity of this research, it suffices here to 
note that the pernicious “tort tax” is not solely a function of the number 
of cases litigated (i.e., the “litigation explosion”) but is also influenced 
by the unmistakable trend of increasing jury awards in cases that are 
 14. See Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, Civil Wars, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2003, at 34. 
 15. The rising cost of consumer goods and services attributable to litigious behavior is 
commonly referred to as a “tort tax.” See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION 
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 4, 11 (1988). 
 16. See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lynn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2, 5 
n.5-6 (2004); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of 
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 (1994). 
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litigated to a verdict (termed here the “verdict explosion”).17
Theoretically, if the market price for “litigated goods” reflects each 
vendor’s individual experiences, contemporary trends toward settlement 
and alternative dispute resolution might well reduce the costs of these 
goods in aggregate. The sting of large jury verdicts, however, is 
primarily absorbed by insurance companies, not individual providers of 
goods and services.18 As a rule, insurance companies set their premiums 
using risk calculations that incorporate data from their own experiences 
as well as those of other participants in the industry.19 If, hypothetically, 
plaintiffs in two medical malpractice cases each receive jury verdicts of 
$20 million, medical malpractice premiums will soar even if ninety-eight 
other malpractice cases settle for reasonable sums.20 Commonsense 
business principles dictate that insurance companies conducting the 
standard “weighted average” calculation account for the rare cases that 
generate large verdicts. The result is that a “verdict explosion”—or small 
minority of cases generating enormous jury awards—can induce a tort 
tax regardless of whether overall trial frequency rises to the level of a 
“litigation explosion.” 
Any tort reform strategy aiming to reduce the tort tax must therefore 
address litigated cases that produce large jury verdicts, and the 
concomitant trend of defendants settling with plaintiffs for unreasonably 
high sums to avert such results. Both trends exert economic pressure on 
insurance companies that ultimately result in higher premiums. Two 
conceivable ways of reducing the resulting tort tax is to place statutory 
caps on jury awards, or establish tort immunity for defendants in 
particular industries. While such measures may reduce insurance costs by 
lowering and stabilizing jury verdicts in these outlying jury cases, they 
raise the fundamental fairness concerns outlined above and lead to 
irresponsible behavior. 
 17. This trend is highlighted in a line of recent Supreme Court cases addressing the Due 
Process and Eighth Amendment implications of excessive verdicts. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 
Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003); Cooper Indus..v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 
1678 (2001); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996); see also Michael Rustad & 
Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort 
Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1275-76 (1993). 
 18. See William T. Barker, Lobbying and the American Law Institute: The Example of 
Insurance Defense, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 573, 574 (1998); John W. Wade, Should Joint and Several 
Liability of Multiple Tortfeasors be Abolished?, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 193, 209 (1986). 
 19. See Frank A. Sloan & Mahmud Hassan, Equity and Accuracy in Medical Malpractice 
Insurance Pricing, 9 J. HEALTH ECON. 289, 292-93 (1990) (discussing risk classification methods 
used by medical malpractice insurers); Herbert I. Weisberg & Thomas J. Tomberlin, A Statistical 
Perspective on Actuarial Methods for Estimating Pure Premiums from Cross-Classified Data, 49 J. 
RISK & INS. 539 (1982). 
 20. Sloan & Hassan, supra note 19, at 290 (“Policyholders may be homogenous; yet losses 
may be concentrated if the adverse outcome has a low probability but high associated loss.”). 
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Implementing a fee-shifting rule that creates strong incentives to 
settle in every case can also modify an insurer’s risk calculus. Such a rule 
offers promise for reform by walking the delicate tightrope between 
fairness to plaintiffs and antipathy toward tort taxes by preserving the 
option to litigate, but making this choice sufficiently unattractive so that 
parties will choose of their own accord to settle. In the final analysis, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, for an insurance company to predict ex ante 
what types of cases will settle and which will be litigated to an adverse 
verdict. But if a fee-shifting rule with universal application discourages 
parties from litigating any case to a verdict, insurance companies will 
face reduced risks that “outlier” cases will yield high jury awards, or that 
insured defendants would be systematically coerced into settling with 
plaintiffs on unfavorable terms. Insurance companies will likely respond 
by lowering premiums, thereby reducing the problematic tort tax. 
 
IV.  THE TWO DOMINANT FEE-SHIFTING PARADIGMS 
 
A.  The American Rule 
 
Over the past two centuries, civil litigation emerged as a popular 
method of dispute resolution,21 a trend that American courts nurtured 
through their development of the common law.22 In the early twentieth 
century, the Supreme Court stressed the importance of preserving access 
to courts as an avenue of redress for injured parties who might otherwise 
take the law into their own hands: “The right to sue and defend in the 
courts is the alternative of force. In an organized society it is the right 
conservative of all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly 
government. It is one of the highest and most essential privileges of 
citizenship. . . .”23 To guarantee the availability of judicial process to 
plaintiffs with limited economic means, nineteenth-century American 
judges rejected the fee-shifting jurisprudence of their colonial 
predecessors, interpreting state statutes to preclude the recovery of 
attorneys’ fees by victorious parties.24 These practices culminated in an 
 21. One author observes that “[al]though litigation has not routed all other forms of fight, it is 
gaining public favor as the legitimate and most effective means of seeking and winning one’s just 
desserts.” LIEBERMAN, supra note 1. 
 22. Legislators and judges in many states remain vigilant in their efforts to preserve the 
American Rule. See, e.g., Crowely v. Katleman, 881 P.2d 1083, 1094-95 (Cal. 1994); In re Estate of 
Keeven, 882 P.2d 457, 465 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); Hearity v. Iowa Dist. Court, 440 N.W.2d 860, 
863 (Iowa 1989); Goodover v. Lindey’s Inc., 843 P.2d 765, 775-76 (Mont. 1992); Lannon v. Lee 
Conner Realty Corp., 385 S.E.2d 380, 383 (Va. 1989). 
 23. Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). 
 24. See Arthur L. Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee 
Recovery, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 9, 10. 
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“American Rule” of fee-shifting, a term coined by Arthur Goodhart to 
refer to the practice of holding each party to a civil litigation responsible 
for its own lawyer’s fees, and freeing the losing party from any 
obligation to reimburse the legal costs of the winner.25 In the twentieth 
century,26 this rule embedded itself in the legal process to such a 
significant degree that on several occasions the United States Supreme 
Court proclaimed its unwillingness to create common law inroads into 
the American Rule in the absence of state or federal legislation.27
 
1.  The policies underlying a “pay your own way” system 
 
While the American Rule is unique among Western legal systems in 
dissociating the obligation to pay legal expenses from trial outcomes,28 
sound policies underlie the institutional reluctance to transfer 
responsibility for attorneys’ fees between litigating parties. Judge 
Cardozo and other jurists theorized that unless one party brought or 
defended a lawsuit in bad faith, the equities between the litigants would 
not be so unbalanced as to justify shifting attorneys’ fees that are 
necessarily incident to establishing legal rights. According to Judge 
Cardozo, 
 
[s]ome of the losses that are incidental to the establishment of rights 
and the redress of wrongs through the processes of courts should be 
allowed, as a matter of social engineering, to lie where they fall. Very 
likely, heavier burdens should be imposed where there is evidence of 
bad faith or mere dogged perversity.29
 
More pragmatically, the American tort system is designed to serve 
 25. Arthur Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal 
Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 651 (1982) [hereinafter 
Rowe I]. 
 26. See Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum, 26 GA. L. REV. 901, 904-05 (1992). See 
generally OLSON, supra note 2. 
 27. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 270 (1975) (“We do 
not purport to assess the merits or demerits of the ‘American Rule’ with respect to the allowance of 
attorneys’ fees. It has been criticized in recent years, and courts have been urged to find exceptions 
to it. . . . But the rule followed in our courts with respect to attorneys’ fees has survived. It is deeply 
rooted in our history and in congressional policy; and it is not for us to invade the legislature’s 
province by redistributing litigation costs. . . .”). 
 28. Outside the United States, only Japan follows the American practice of systematically 
assigning each party responsibility for its own legal fees for most classes of civil cases. One 
significant exception is tort suits, where the defendant is required to pay the legal expenses of a 
prevailing plaintiff. See Rowe I, supra note 25, at 651 n.1. 
 29. Letter from Benjamin N. Cardozo to H.H. Nordlinger, quoted in G. HELLMAN, 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO: AMERICAN JUDGE 150 (1940). 
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the dual function of compensating plaintiffs for their individual injuries 
and, on a broader scale, to limit the incidence of high-risk behavior.30 To 
satisfy both objectives, the legal system must tolerate some fruitless 
claims to promote the vigilance of potential tortfeasors engaged in high-
risk activities.31 For many plaintiffs, particularly those seeking damages 
that are modest relative to their attorney’s fees, the prospect of also 
paying their opponent’s legal expenses if they lose creates a significant 
disincentive to bringing suit. Under such a regime, where the normative 
value of particular legal rights outweighs a plaintiff’s financial interest in 
their preservation (such as the right to exclude strangers from one’s 
property), such rights might atrophy from lack of enforcement. 
Finally, the American Rule has value despite the claims of some 
critics that it defeats the tort system’s avowed goal of “making the victim 
whole,” or placing a victorious plaintiff in the same financial position 
they occupied prior to the tortious event: “Undeniably, the American 
Rule’s effect of reducing a successful plaintiff’s recovery by the amount 
of his lawyer’s fee conflicts with the make-whole idea underlying much 
of the law of remedies.”32 Indeed, conceptualizing the costs of bringing 
or defending a lawsuit as a “legal injury” akin to the physical or 
emotional injuries resulting from tortious conduct casts doubt on the 
wisdom of a fee-shifting rule that permits recovery of one but not the 
other. A 1925 report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts reduced 
the argument to a single question: “On what principle of justice can a 
plaintiff wrongfully run down on a public highway recover his doctor’s 
bill but not his lawyer’s bill?”33
However, the American legal system has never accorded a plaintiff’s 
physical injuries and legal fees equivalent status.34 Indeed, “our system 
does not regard bringing (or, for that matter, defending) a losing case—
without more—as the infliction of a legal wrong.”35 Precisely why 
attorneys’ fees occupy an unequal position relative to other forms of 
tortious injury is a matter of speculation. The high value that Americans 
attach to litigation—both as a means of deterring injurious behavior and 
resolving civil disputes —indicates that citizens may regard litigation 
 30. See Gregory A. Hicks, Statutory Damage Caps are an Incomplete Reform: A Proposal 
for Attorney Fee Shifting in Tort Actions, 49 LA. L. REV. 763, 774-75 (1989). 
 31. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and 
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1831 (1997). 
 32. Rowe I, supra note 25, at 657. 
 33. Judicial Council of Massachusetts, First Report, 11 MASS. L.Q. 7, 64 (1925). 
 34. The United States Supreme Court has observed in the administrative law context that 
“[m]ere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable 
injury.” Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974). 
 35. Rowe I, supra note 25, at 659. See Philip J. Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-Examination 
of the Indemnity System, 55 IOWA L. REV. 26, 30 (1969). 
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expenses as necessarily incident to the exercise of a valuable right, rather 
than as a source of additional financial injury. Perhaps Americans view 
attorneys’ fees differently due to the inherent avoidability of legal 
expenditures. To extend the hypothetical offered by the Judicial Council 
of Massachusetts, a plaintiff is powerless to prevent the medical injuries 
that result from being run over in the street, but in many cases could limit 
or eliminate litigation expenses through non-adversarial strategies such 
as settlement. This conception of litigation is consistent with the high 
premium that citizens place on the option to litigate but suggests that a 
trial with all the bells and whistles should be a last resort for resolving 
civil disputes. 
One final explanation for the disparate treatment of 
physical/emotional injury and attorneys’ fees within the tort system is the 
similarity of legal costs to consequential economic losses that are denied 
as a matter of policy to tort plaintiffs. As the First Circuit observed in 
Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Marau: “[M]any of the ‘financially 
injured’ will find it easier than the ‘physically injured’ to arrange for 
cheaper, alternative compensation. The typical “financial” plaintiff is 
likely to . . . buy [] insurance, and . . . may well be able to arrange for 
‘first party’ loss compensation for foreseeable financial harm.”36 While 
this theory fails to explain the application of the American Rule in legal 
regimes that permit the recovery of pure economic loss, it is worth noting 
that legislative exceptions to the American Rule are far more prevalent 
outside the tort system.37
 
2.  Drawbacks of the American Rule 
 
Particularly within the last twenty years, the American Rule has been 
denounced as inefficient and unfair. Critics assert that parties with only 
their own legal expenses to consider are encouraged to engage in 
wasteful litigation.38 Congressional opposition to the American Rule 
reached a fever pitch in 1994, as the House of Representatives 
considered the wholesale adoption of a British-style, “loser pays” fee-
shifting system as a component of the “Contract with America” 
legislative program.39 The Bush Administration’s Council on 
 36. 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 37. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 38. Lorraine Wright Feuerstein, Comment, Two-Way Fee Shifting on Summary Judgment or 
Dismissal: An Equitable Deterrent to Unmeritorious Lawsuits, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 125, 128 (1995) 
(“The American rule provides no deterrent to groundless litigation. In fact it invites spurious 
claims.”) (citing further scholarly criticism of the American rule). 
 39. Thomas D. Rowe, Indemnity or Compensation? The Contract with America, Loser-Pays 
Attorney Fee Shifting, and a One-Way Alternative, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 317, 319 (1998) [hereinafter 
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Competitiveness, led by Vice President Dan Quayle, defended the 
proposal, arguing that “[b]ecause the losing party will be obligated to pay 
the winner’s fees, this approach will encourage litigants to evaluate 
carefully the merits of their cases before initiating a frivolous claim or 
adopting a spurious defense.”40
But even as the American Rule is impugned for failing to deter non-
meritorious litigation practices, it is simultaneously criticized for over-
deterring lawsuits by plaintiffs bringing small claims that are swallowed 
by attorneys’ fees: “Even though the American Rule may encourage the 
filing of claims that have no basis in law or fact, some legitimate claims 
may still remain unredressed when the cost to litigate exceeds the 
possible recovery.”41 While in some cases an attorney will represent the 
plaintiff on a contingency fee basis, it is unlikely that lawyers will invest 
their time in cases with a low potential payoff. 
Consequently, individuals are discouraged from using the courts to 
vindicate clear legal entitlements in two types of cases. First, injured 
plaintiffs are deterred from filing claims when the economic magnitude 
of their injury is small relative to their anticipated legal expenses, 
particularly when they are the sole victim of the tortfeasor’s conduct. For 
example, failure to repay a small debt or to adhere to a contract after the 
other party has performed may not give rise to a viable lawsuit. States 
typically restrict the jurisdiction of small claims courts to trivial sums,42 
leaving a sizable gap between the jurisdictional ceiling of these courts 
and the magnitude of financial injury that economically justifies 
litigating in a court of general jurisdiction.43 Cases slipping between the 
cracks of small claims courts and courts of general jurisdiction might 
become cause for alarm if they reflected systematic absorption of injury 
damages by victims. However, the sporadic incidence of sharp practices 
imposes fairly minor costs due to the small amounts at stake and the 
availability of extra-judicial means of inducing compliance (including 
threats to reputation, damage to credit history, etc.). 
Of greater social concern are cases in which the benefits of litigating 
Rowe II]. 
 40. Dan Quayle, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 979, 1003 
(1992). 
 41. Feuerstein, supra note 38, at 130-31. See also Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of 
Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REV. 792 (1966). 
 42. For example, the jurisdictional limit for small claims courts in New York is $3,000, while 
small claims courts in Massachusetts only adjudicate claims of $1500 or less. See Gerald Lebovits, 
Special Procedures Apply to Enforcing Judgments in Small Claims Courts, 71 N.Y. ST. B.J. 28 
(1999) (citing Small Claims §§ 1813(a) – 1813–A(a)); Douglas L. Fox, Damages in Massachusetts 
Litigation, 2 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN DAMAGES CASES § 2.16 (2003). 
 43. See Bruce Zucker & Monica Her, The People’s Court Examined: A Legal and Empirical 
Analysis of the Small Claims Court Examined, 37 U.S.F. L. Rev. 315, 319, 326 (2003). 
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far outweigh the costs but where litigation is still unattractive because the 
benefits take the form of a public good. This class of lawsuits can be 
further sub-divided into two categories. First, a defendant may inflict an 
injury diffused over a sufficiently large group of potential plaintiffs such 
that it is not in the interest of any single plaintiff to assume the financial 
burden of initiating legal action. Consider a nuisance case in which 
emissions from a factory degrade the air quality for neighboring 
residents.44 The residents may possess an entitlement to clean air, but the 
transaction costs of overcoming collection action problems to institute 
legal proceedings may preclude enforcement of this entitlement. Critics 
of the American Rule observe that a fee-shifting rule requiring the 
defendant to reimburse the legal costs of a victorious plaintiff would 
dramatically reduce the financial obstacles to filing suit.45 Indeed, 
plaintiffs with an unambiguous legal entitlement are attractive candidates 
for contingency fee arrangements.46
The second sub-category of high-impact/small-recovery cases are 
those in which bringing suit is financially risky because liability can only 
be established through a change in the existing law. Professor Frank 
Cross observes that: 
 
A fundamental outcome of litigation, and perhaps its greatest benefit to 
society, is producing precedents that define the law, affect subsequent 
decisions, and influence private economic behavior. However, such 
precedents are in many respects externalities or public goods because 
the litigants themselves cannot capture much of the benefit associated 
with a precedent that their case creates.47
 
Concededly, a potential plaintiff is more likely to fight for a change 
in the law as a “private attorney general” outside the tort system. For 
 44. A. M. POLINKSY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 15 (2d ed. 1989); Guido 
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 45. Martha Pacold, Comment, Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions Governed by Fee-Shifting 
Statutes, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1007 (2001) (discussing the fee-shifting methods and the 
calculations of attorneys’ fees where the loser must pay the prevailing party). 
 46. Fee-shifting schemes purporting to encourage efficient levels of litigation cannot rely on 
class litigation to overcome the public goods dilemma, but must create incentives for plaintiffs to sue 
in their individual capacity. The efficacy of class litigation is not only restrained by formidable 
procedural obstacles to certifying a class, see, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) & (b) ((detailing the 
manifold requirements that plaintiffs must satisfy to maintain a class action lawsuit), but in many 
cases “the cost of organizing the class and of overcoming free-rider problems may well [be] too high 
for the class to form and litigate.”); Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 205, 220 (1982). 
 47. Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2000); see 
generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 235 (1979). 
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example, the predominantly statute-based realms of civil rights, labor, 
tax, and regulatory behavior are prime forums for plaintiffs with proper 
financial incentive to fight stagnation in the law by litigating disputes 
that reveal pathologies in the status quo understanding of particular 
statutes. While the tort system may be older and less dynamic than 
blossoming areas of statutory law, it is also more susceptible to 
ossification and, therefore, in need of occasional shocks from 
enterprising plaintiffs. For example, Judge Cardozo’s opinion in 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.48 revolutionized the field of products 
liability by eliminating the requirement of privity between the injured 
party and the manufacturer. Advocates of fee-shifting would denounce 
the American Rule by emphasizing the ex ante unattractiveness of 
MacPherson’s position. Not only did he assume substantial financial risk 
by bringing suit as a party with no privity to the manufacturer, but he 
must also have known that he could only prevail by accomplishing a 
change in the law at the end of a costly appeals process.49
While MacPherson and other groundbreaking tort cases50 illustrate 
that the American Rule does not systematically chill landmark tort 
litigation, the costs of undertaking trials and appeals are higher today 
than they were when such cases as MacPherson and Escola were 
litigated.51 Presuming that the social benefits of instigating shocks to the 
tort system generally outweigh the costs to the individual litigant,52 the 
American Rule’s failure to reward risk-taking plaintiffs inflicts costs on 
society. These consequences are exacerbated in the tort system, where 
the private nature of injuries deters special interests and other 
organizational plaintiffs from subsidizing the costs of tort lawsuits in the 
public interest. 
A final disadvantage of the American Rule is its unequal treatment of 
 48. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 49. While some commentators invoke “repeat player” theories to explain litigation behavior 
that appears irrational within the context of a single case, plaintiffs like MacPherson (or even their 
attorneys) are unlikely repeat players because they have little to gain in future litigation. Repeat 
players are predominantly tort defendants, who may act irrationally in a small cluster of cases in 
order to establish favorable precedent that pre-empts future lawsuits at their expense. See Cross, 
supra note 47, at 9. 
 50. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab, 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975) (rejecting the existing theory of 
contributory negligence and adopting a pure comparative negligence standard); Escola v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (advocating for a rule of strict 
liability for manufacturers to replace California’s negligence-based regime). 
 51. See, e.g., Meade W. Mitchell, Discovery Abuse and a Proposed Reform: Mandatory 
Disclosure, 62 Miss. L. J. 743, 750 (1993) (observing that modern discovery practices have 
dramatically increased the costs of litigation). 
 52. This may not always be the case. In Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), the 
California Supreme Court controversially held that a bystander who witnesses a close relative being 
injured can recover damages for emotional distress. Yet the vague standard established in Dillon was 
subsequently rejected by most other states. See Feuerstein, supra note 38, at 162. 
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cases with similar expected values but different relative strengths. If a 
case is divided into two primary components—liability and damages—
the expected value of the case is equal to the product of (1) the 
probability of proving liability (or the percentage of liability in a pure 
comparative fault regime), and (2) the reasonably calculated damages.53 
From an efficiency standpoint, cases with a comparable expected value 
should yield similar compensation for plaintiffs. Consider the following 
two cases: (1) A plaintiff claims he suffered whiplash from an 
automobile accident in which the defendant was clearly at fault; (2) a 
plaintiff claims that she fell out of bed and broke her legs because her 
doctor administered an excessive dose of antibiotic.54
In the first instance, the liability component of the case is strong, but 
damages are more uncertain. Conversely, liability is more difficult to 
prove in the second case, but the damages are easily ascertainable. 
Because the American Rule does not penalize parties who litigate to the 
hilt, it encourages plaintiffs who can overcome summary judgment to 
argue exhaustively (at significant expense to both parties) the flimsier 
damages claim once they have reached the jury. By contrast, plaintiffs 
with a concrete damages claim but a weaker case for liability is unlikely 
to obtain a settlement offer that approximates their damages since the 
defendants will often channel their resources into a fight for dismissal at 
the summary judgment stage. This horizontal inequality between cases 
with similar expected values illustrates the inefficiency that plagues the 
tort system under the American Rule. In a world without transaction 
costs, a defendant would expend scarce financial resources to offer 
partial compensation to “weak-liability plaintiffs” (appropriately 
discounted to reflect uncertain liability). “Strong-liability plaintiffs” 
would similarly accept an offer of compensation that accurately reflects 
their injuries, without expending resources to finance a roll of the dice 
with a jury. 
 
B.  The British Rule 
 
Proposals to modify the American Rule invariably incorporate 
elements of the “British” or “loser pays” rule. In its purest form, the 
British Rule requires the losing party in a civil litigation to pay the 
winning party’s attorney’s fees.55 This species of attorney-fee 
 53. See Stephen J. Spurr & Walter O. Simmons, Medical Malpractice in Michigan: 21 An 
Economic Analysis, J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 315, 333 (1996). 
 54. See Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968). 
 55. Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 44 (1984). 
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reimbursement is known as “two-way” fee-shifting because costs can 
flow either from the defendant to the plaintiff or vice versa depending on 
the outcome of the case.56 The pillar of the British Rule is the shift of 
attorneys’ fees under a system of “general indemnification.”57 
Indemnification is the equivalent of strict or no-fault liability in tort; the 
party adjudged to have lost the case is responsible for the winner’s 
attorney’s fees regardless of the margin of victory or the objective merit 
of the loser’s case.58
While the British Rule offers certain efficiency advantages,59 the rule 
in its unadulterated state is incompatible with the American conception 
of litigation as an important correlate of justice. Citizens in the United 
States place a high premium on the option to go to court, and the 
deterrent effect of the British Rule undoubtedly closes the courthouse 
doors to many low-income parties. Some laud the British Rule as a 
corrective mechanism for the American Rule’s over-deterrence of small 
claims in which the operative legal rule substantially favors the potential 
plaintiff.60 However, while the British Rule might discourage frivolous 
litigation when legal standards are clear, tort claims are inherently fact-
sensitive and rarely susceptible to predictable outcomes under clear 
unambiguous legal rules.61 As soon as legal uncertainty is introduced into 
a dispute, parties who are risk-averse or have shallow pockets may be 
hesitant to expose themselves to substantial fee-shifts at the close of 
litigation. The British Rule is particularly troubling because it imposes 
this chilling effect disproportionately on private litigants opposing 
individually wealthy or commercial defendants who rapidly accumulate 
legal expenses.62
Finally, a fee-shifting rule predicated on no-fault indemnification has 
a punitive ring that is inconsistent with the exalted status of litigation in 
American society. Professor Thomas Rowe remarks that “[p]ractices in 
this country . . . leave room for the feeling that losers will often not have 
been unreasonable or unjustified in insisting on litigation.”63 Judge 
 56. Robin Stanley, Note, Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia 
Department of Health and Human Resources: To the Prevailing Party Goes the Spoils . . . and the 
Attorney’s Fees!, 36 AKRON L. REV. 363, 368 & n.30 (2003). 
 57. Rowe I, supra note 25, at 655. 
 58. See Rowe II, supra note 39, at 321-22. 
 59. See John J. Donohue III, Opting For the British Rule, Or If Posner And Shavell Can’t 
Remember The Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1118 (1991). 
 60. See id. 
 61. See Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and the Predictability of Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
427, 437-38 (1995) (hereinafter Hylton II). 
 62. See Gregory E. Maggs & Michael D. Weiss, Progress on Attorney’s Fees: Expanding the 
“Loser Pays” Rule In Texas, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1915, 1927 (1994). 
 63. Rowe I, supra note 25, at 655-56. 
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Cardozo offered this first-hand perspective: “I have seen enough of the 
judicial process to know its imperfections. I would not lay too heavy a 
burden upon the unsuccessful litigant.”64
 
V.  ECHOES OF THE BRITISH RULE IN AMERICAN REFORM 
 
A.  State and Federal Modification of the American Rule 
 
While a wholesale adoption of the British Rule is infeasible for the 
American judicial process, Congress and various states have morphed the 
American and British Rules into hybrid fee-shifting schemes for use in 
certain state and federal lawsuits.65 Before analyzing these schemes, 
recall that the two primary criticisms of the American Rule are its under-
deterrence of frivolous litigation tactics and its over-deterrence of 
plaintiffs with small but meritorious claims.66 Generally, critics who are 
disillusioned by wasteful litigation will prefer one-way fee-shifting rules 
that transfer costs only from plaintiffs to prevailing defendants. On the 
other hand, those predominantly concerned about the prospects of small-
claim plaintiffs advocate for statutory provisions that shift fees in the 
opposite direction. 
The process of translating these policy objectives into concrete fee-
shifting rules occurs on parallel tracks in Congress and the state 
legislatures. However, commentators routinely overlook the divergent 
objectives of federal fee-shifting rules and analogous state provisions. 
Legislators in Washington fashion fee-shifting provisions to encourage 
plaintiffs to act as private attorneys general when enforcement of the 
rights in question serves the public interest.67 Federal fee-shifting 
provisions are accordingly designed to discourage litigation that impedes 
the exercise of these statutory rights.68 Conversely, state-conceived fee-
shifting rules are applied to legal subject matter that governs more 
individualized disputes in such common law realms as contract, tort, and 
 64. Cardozo quoted in HELLMAN, supra note 29. 
 65. By 1983, Congress had passed over two hundred federal statutes containing fee-shifting 
provisions into law. Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. Carns, Alaska’s English Rule: Attorney’s Fee 
Shifting in Civil Cases, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 33, 37(1996) (citing 3 Mary Francis Derfner & Arthur 
D. Wolf, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, table of statutes (1983)). Texas and California have 
legislated significant modifications to the American Rule for particular types of cases, while Alaska 
features a blanket fee-shifting scheme that more closely resembles the British rule than the American 
Rule. Feuerstein, supra note 38, at 133. 
 66. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 67. See Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health and Human 
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 635-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Marisa L. Ugalde, The Future of 
Environmental Citizen Suits After Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia 
Department of Health & Human Services, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 589, 594-95 (2002). 
 68. See Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 65, at 37. 
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property. 
As a policy tool designed to promote efficiency, fee-shifting rules 
mold to a particular sovereign’s conception of optimality. In the federal 
system, efficiency is reached at the point where the public interest is 
maximized.69 In certain statutory areas where fee-shifting provisions are 
common, including environmental law, consumer protection, and civil 
rights, the public interest may be measured in units of preservation, 
safety, and personal dignity, rather than dollars and cents.70 Thus, 
reaching the efficient level of litigation from a public interest perspective 
is not accomplished by seeking to enforce legal rights at the lowest cost, 
but by gradually adding flesh to the bones of statutory language through 
repeated legal challenges. 
In the state tort system, however, the salient objective is not to 
determine the scope of newly created rights, but to apply well-
established legal rules to particular, often challenging, factual 
scenarios.71 In this Coasean paradigm,72 litigation is a transaction cost of 
enforcing compliance with legal rules. Because an excessive number of 
lawsuits artificially distorts the price of engaging in particular behavior,73 
the efficient level of tort litigation is the minimal level of litigation 
necessary to ensure full compliance with legal rules. 
Given the dissimilar goals of federal and state fee-shifting rules, one 
would expect the malleable American and British rules to be sculpted 
differently by federal and state legislators. Specifically, a fee-shifting 
rule tailored for the tort system would impose financial penalties for 
bringing or defending non-meritorious claims and encourage parties to 
settle immediately after ascertaining the extent of the defendant’s 
liability under the relevant legal rules. However, a fee-shifting provision 
in a federal statutory scheme might provide plaintiffs with incentives to 
 69. See Joseph K. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of 
Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 180-201 (2004) (outlining general goals of the tort system). 
 70. See Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court, 
Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291, 309 (1990) (in § II.B.3, discussing the stated 
legislative goals of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976). 
 71. See Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort Reform, 59 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 475, 518-19 (2002). 
 72. See generally, Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.1, 1-44 
(1960). 
 73. See Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th Cong. 
§ 2(a)(4) (1996) (vetoed) (observing that the consequence of excessive and unpredictable damage 
awards is that “consumers have been adversely affected through the withdrawal of products, 
producers, services, and service providers from the marketplace”); Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 
470, 479 (Cal. 1988) (blaming the tort system for contributing to sharp increases in the price of 
Bendectin and DTP vaccine); HUBER, supra note 15, at 155-61 (asserting that strict products liability 
has caused stagnation in research and development in the drug, contraceptive, chemical, small 
aircraft, automotive, and medical industries). 
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litigate for the purpose of compiling a comprehensive record that enables 
judges to formulate reasoned constructions of the law. As discussed 
below, the fee-shifting rules emerging in both systems are strikingly 
similar, raising the possibility that state-led reforms of the American 
Rule sacrifice efficiency by furnishing plaintiffs with incentives to 
litigate that are inappropriate in tort. 
 
B.  The Result of State and Federal Fee-Shifting Experimentation: Broad 
Judicial Discretion Under a Pro-Prevailing Plaintiff Regime 
 
On the federal level, Congress inserts boilerplate fee-shifting 
language into select statutes, reflecting a one-dimensional purpose of 
removing obstacles for potential plaintiffs that does not vary with the 
subject matter of the statutory rights created. For example, in 1974 
Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA), a law designed to regulate the private employee benefit system 
and, specifically, to ensure that workers received the benefits promised to 
them by their employers.74 The statute grants courts the power to award 
attorneys’ fees through language that is “broad and unconstrained”:75 
“[t]he court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and 
costs of action to either party.”76 In 1976, Congress enacted the Civil 
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act,77 which uses nearly identical 
language in authorizing judges to shift fees in federal civil rights actions: 
“The court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a 
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”78 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has encouraged lower courts to develop federal common law to 
guide judges applying these uniform fee-shifting provisions, observing 
that the “fee-shifting statutes’ similar language is a ‘strong indication’ 
that they are to be interpreted alike.”79
Fee-shifting statutes enacted in states such as Alaska, California, and 
Texas closely track their federal analogues. For instance, the Alaska 
Code of Civil Procedure grants judges broad discretion to award fees to 
victorious litigants: “Except as otherwise provided by statute, the 
 74. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994). See BARBARA J. COLEMAN, PRIMER ON ERISA FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES 5 (BNA 3d ed. 1989). 
 75. Da-Wai Hu, Comment, Running the Caucus-Race: Prevailing Parties and Fee Shifting 
under ERISA, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 217, 220 (2000). 
 76. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (1994)). 
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. IV 1992). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758 n.2 (1989); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 
461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983) (“The standards set forth in this opinion are generally applicable in all 
cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a ‘prevailing party.’”). 
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supreme court [of Alaska] shall determine by rule or order what costs, if 
any, including attorney fees, shall be allowed the prevailing party in any 
case.”80 Unlike Alaska, California has no blanket fee-shifting provision 
that applies to all civil actions brought in state court but enforces fee-
shifting rules for specific types of controversies. In rare categories of 
cases, including dog-breeding disputes81 and breaches of contract for 
swimming pool construction,82 California law automatically requires the 
losing party to compensate the victor for her attorney’s fees. However, 
the majority of California’s fee-shifting rules grant broad discretion to 
trial judges.83 Ironically, Texas’s fee-shifting rules, which most closely 
approximate the efficiency ideal articulated above, exclude state tort 
claims from their reach.84 Nonetheless, by mandating fee-shifting in such 
areas as landlord-tenant disputes,85 distribution of alcoholic beverages,86 
and city building ordinances,87 these Texas statutes and the small 
minority of California laws that eliminate discretion in fee-shifting 
provide an important model for tort reformists. 
The fee-shifting models adopted in the states contain three flaws that 
undermine their fairness and efficiency: (1) an implicit preference for 
prevailing plaintiffs over prevailing defendants, (2) broad grants of fee-
shifting discretion to trial judges that result in unpredictable outcomes 
and collateral litigation, and (3) a tendency to improperly influence the 
primary behavior of future litigants. 
 
1.  Inefficiency resulting from the judicial preference for awarding fees 
to prevailing plaintiffs 
 
Although the neutral language of two-way fee-shifting provisions 
implies that prevailing plaintiffs and defendants are equally entitled to 
attorneys’ fees, judges routinely interpret both state and federal fee-
shifting rules as expressing a strong preference for prevailing plaintiffs. 
One commentator examining the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards 
Act observed that “despite the statutory phrases ‘in its discretion’ and 
‘prevailing party,’ . . . fees are normally awarded only to prevailing 
plaintiffs. The effect of [section] 1988 is that prevailing plaintiffs almost 
 80. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(a)(1) (1959). 
 81. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25989.555 (West Supp. 1995). 
 82. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7168 (West Supp. 1995). 
 83. See RICHARD M. PEARL, CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS § 2.4 (Christopher D. 
Dworin ed., 2d ed. 1994). 
 84. See generally Maggs  & Weiss, supra note 62. 
 85. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.0062 (West Supp. 1995). 
 86. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 102.79 (West Supp. 1995). 
 87. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 214.0015 (West Supp. 1995). 
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always recover their fees whereas prevailing defendants can recover fees 
only in exceptional circumstances.”88 State judges are as susceptible to 
mimicking federal practices as their legislative counterparts. In 
California, “[e]ven when a statute’s language is discretionary and allows 
for recovery by either party, courts interpret it as presumptively requiring 
awards to plaintiffs and disallowing fee-shifting to defendants.”89 In 
practice, this judicial doctrine of plaintiff preference precludes victorious 
defendants from recovering their attorney’s fees unless the plaintiff’s suit 
is “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”90 Thus, losing 
defendants are held to a British-style strict liability standard mitigated 
slightly by the court’s equitable powers, while defeated plaintiffs only 
reimburse fees under fault-based, negligence principles. 
Construing these statutes as shifting fees to prevailing defendants 
under negligence-based theories is erroneous as a matter of statutory 
construction. Federal law already imposes a negligence-based regime 
under which courts may shift fees to parties victimized by wasteful 
litigation practices: “Any attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings 
in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to 
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees 
reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”91 Moreover, at least 
thirty-four states have adopted provisions similar to Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that authorize courts to sanction parties 
engaging in non-meritorious litigation practices by shifting attorneys’ 
fees.92 These statutes are rendered superfluous when judges interpret 
state fee-shifting laws to transfer attorneys’ fees to defendants under 
fault-based schemes oriented around buzzwords (“unreasonable,” 
“frivolous,” “vexatious,” “without foundation”) already operative under 
existing law. 
More significantly, fee-shifting rules skewed toward prevailing 
plaintiffs induce inefficiency and unfairness into the tort system. Pro-
prevailing plaintiff rules undermine the leverage of defendants in 
settlement negotiations, since the plaintiffs’ bar, cognizant of the 
expansive bounds prescribed by such terms as “unreasonable” and 
 88. Joel H. Trotter, The Catalyst Theory of Civil Rights Fee Shifting After Farrar v. Hobby, 
80 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1432-33 (1994). 
 89. PEARL, supra note 83, at § 2.7; see Sokolow v. County of San Mateo, 261 Cal. Rptr. 520, 
528 (Ct. App. 1989). 
 90. Id.; see also PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: SECTION 
1983 AND RELATED STATUTES 572 (2d ed. 1994) (observing that under the Civil Rights Attorney’s 
Fees Awards Act, plaintiffs are only obliged to reimburse the prevailing defendant’s attorney’s fees 
if the litigation is unreasonable, frivolous, groundless, or vexatious). 
 91. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
 92. Gerald F. Hess, Rule 11 Practice in Federal and State Court: an Empirical, Comparative 
Study, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 313, 315 (1992); see FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
    
317] REVERSE COST-SHIFTING 337 
 
“frivolous,” can temper their litigation strategies so as never to do worse 
than the American Rule regardless of outcome. Defendants, on the other 
hand, must prevail at trial to avoid subsidizing the as-yet-unknown 
attorney’s fees of their opponent.93 Without equivalent prospects of fee 
reimbursement, defendants are under more pressure to settle than their 
plaintiff-opponents. Consequently, plaintiffs systematically capture a 
“settlement surplus,”94 or premium over and above reasonable 
compensation for injury that reflects the disproportionate risks to the 
defendant of litigating. 
From an efficiency perspective, the judiciary’s zeal to remove 
financial obstacles for plaintiffs also imposes social costs on non-parties 
whose interests are threatened by raising the costs of defendants’ 
conduct. If widget manufacturers consistently pay higher settlements to 
injured plaintiffs and/or are obligated to assume disproportionate fee-
shifting risk for litigated disputes, they will raise the price of widgets to 
reflect these increased costs. Perhaps the price of widgets was artificially 
low under the American Rule due to the over-deterrence of small claims; 
nonetheless, it is difficult to claim that a rule skewed towards pro-
prevailing plaintiffs transmits more accurate signals to producers and 
consumers than an evenly administered two-way rule that binds each 
party equally to the merits of their case. 
 
2.  Inefficiency resulting from broad statutory discretion granted to the 
judges who administer hybrid fee-shifting rules 
 
The vast majority of state fee-shifting statutes do not mandate the 
automatic transfer of attorneys’ fees after the trial is concluded but grant 
broad discretion to judges to determine when and to what degree the 
losing party should reimburse the winner for his attorney’s fees.95 In the 
federal system, courts of appeals have developed complex multi-factor 
balancing tests to assess the propriety of fee shifts under the 
circumstances of the particular case. The first of these tests emerged 
from the Tenth Circuit,96 which proposed the following five factors for 
courts to consider: (1) the degree of the offending parties’ culpability or 
 93. While most fee-shifting statutes limit the victor’s recovery to “reasonable attorney’s 
fees,” such unknown variables as the nature of discovery, the length of trial, the number of 
witnesses, and the use of experts can cause significant fluctuations in the amount of attorneys’ fees 
that a judge would deem “reasonable.” Moreover, defendants are rarely in a position to predict how a 
judge will perceive the equities of a particular case and allocate fees correspondingly. 
 94. See Hylton I, supra note 7, at 1084-85. 
 95. See Melissa L. Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a 
Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 402 (1990). 
 96. Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 464-65 (10th Cir. 1978). 
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bad faith, (2) the ability of the parties to personally satisfy an award of 
attorney’s fees, (3) whether or not an award of attorneys’ fees against the 
offending parties would deter other persons acting under similar 
circumstances, (4) the amount of benefit conferred on non-parties to the 
litigation, and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions.97 The 
Seventh Circuit attempted to simplify the fee-shifting calculus98 by 
establishing a presumption that courts should shift fees to the prevailing 
party unless (1) the losing party argued a non-frivolous position with a 
“solid basis,” or (2) special circumstances warranted against awarding 
fees for equitable reasons.99
These tests illustrate the amorphous process of administering 
identically worded state fee-shifting provisions and raise the specter of 
collateral litigation, or costly legal activity peripheral to the primary 
dispute that often occurs when fee-shifting rules are applied. Efficiency 
mavens may accept fee-shifting as an antidote to the necessary evil of 
litigation, but fee-shifting rules that themselves spawn litigation are 
unforgivable. Yet rules that fail to shift fees automatically motivate 
parties to brief and argue the fee-shifting question ad nauseum given the 
high financial stakes. 
Another oft-litigated issue implicates the meaning of the phrase 
“prevailing party” commonly found in state and federal fee-shifting 
statutes. For example, does a litigant “prevail” if they win but receive 
only nominal damages?100 Should plaintiffs be entitled to attorney’s fees 
if the defendant grants the plaintiff a substantial measure of the relief 
requested through a settlement? Advocates of “catalyst theory” argue 
that a plaintiff has “prevailed” within the meaning of the relevant statute 
if the defendant agrees to alter its controversial conduct as a result of the 
litigation,101 while critics point out that defendants often settle with 
plaintiffs for reasons having nothing to do with the merits of the 
plaintiff’s complaint.102 The important lesson for tort reformists is that 
the collateral litigation spurred by broad delegations of discretion to trial 
judges and the uncertainty surrounding the “prevailing party” language 
 97. Id. at 465. 
 98. Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 99. Id. at 830. 
 100. See, e.g., Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992) (ruling that a civil rights plaintiff 
who sued for $17 million but only received nominal damages of one dollar was not entitled to 
attorney’s fees: “to qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some 
relief on the merits of his claim”). 
 101. Adam Babich, Fee Shifting after Buckhannon, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10137 (2002). 
 102. See Hooper v. Demco, Inc., 37 F.3d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 1994) (“A suit may be groundless, 
and settled for its nuisance value, or settled by a party for wholly gratuitous reasons, thus not 
justifying an award of attorney’s fees.”). 
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results in large inefficiencies.103
 
3.  Inefficiency resulting from the failure of hybrid fee-shifting provisions 
to encourage compliance with legal rules 
 
An ideal fee-shifting rule would not only function efficiently after 
the fact, when a plaintiff alleges injury, but also work backwards to 
increase incentives for actors to conform their primary behavior to 
existing legal rules.104 A fee-shifting rule with automatic application that 
treats plaintiffs and defendants identically would have the collateral 
benefit of encouraging compliance with legal rules by making litigation 
an equally unattractive fall-back position for all potential parties. To 
illustrate, a fee-shifting statute that imposes disproportionate litigation 
costs on plaintiffs is inefficient because it emboldens defendants to 
violate legal rules, secure in the knowledge that financial obstacles will 
compel their victims to suffer silently out of court.105 Conversely, the 
current pro-prevailing plaintiff standard that insures the fees of victorious 
plaintiffs and limits their exposure in defeat may encourage defendants to 
over-invest in efforts to adhere to legal rules,106 while simultaneously 
encouraging plaintiffs to engage in morally hazardous behavior.107 
Finally, a fee-shifting rule applied unpredictably will likely have 
randomized effects that impose cumulative inefficiencies; certain 
individuals or commercial parties may conduct themselves with 
excessive caution while others engage in careless activity. 
Ultimately, fee-shifting rules should function as predictably and 
equitably as the legal rules under which they operate. Discrepancies in 
the clarity of fee-shifting rules and legal rules in tort, while frustrating, 
are understandable in light of their disparate ages and unequal exposure 
to iterative development. Legal rules inherently defy automatic 
application, but require common law refinement to guide the exercise of 
judicial discretion. Hence, one can posit the presence of certain legal 
 103. See Nelken, supra note 95, at 391-92 (“[S]ome judges question whether the frivolous 
cases Rule 11 keeps out of court might not be less of a burden on the system than the litigation the 
rule generates over sanctions.”). 
 104. See Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 808 (1990) (“[J]udges, 
lawyers, and legal scholars have argued that fear of liability will compel potential tortfeasors to 
engage in a cost-benefit analysis, taking just those safety precautions that cost less than the accidents 
they prevent.”). 
 105. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American 
Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2002) 
(discussing how legislative immunity leads to dangerous behavior). 
 106. See Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 2075 
(1993) (§ II, Costs of One-way Fee Shifting). 
 107. Id. 
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uncertainties while the tort regime endured its growing pains. However, 
the narrow substantive scope and conceptual simplicity of fee-shifting 
rules suggest an alternative to the inevitable period of uncertainty under a 
new fee-shifting regime. State legislators can promulgate fee-shifting 
rules that are not beholden to an act of judicial discretion, but 
presumptively operate in the absence of extenuating circumstances. 
On a normative level, clear legal rules permit people to coordinate 
their behavior to maximize joint utility. Guido Calabresi observes “as 
long as individuals are adequately informed about the alternatives and as 
long as the cost to society of giving them what they want is reflected in 
the cost to the individual, the individual can decide better than anyone 
else what he wants.”108 Until fee-shifting rules attain the same level of 
refinement as the tort rules that they enforce, civil parties will be unable 
to coordinate their behavior so as to minimize both their individual 
transaction costs and the broader social costs resulting from litigation. 
 
VI.  REVERSE-COST SHIFTING (RCS) 
 
A.  Introduction to RCS 
 
The RCS Rule is conceptually simple: “In civil actions, the losing 
side pays a multiple of its own costs to the court.”109 Legislators would 
fix this multiple, or “compensation factor,” by statute in each 
jurisdiction.110 If, for example, the multiple is fixed at 1, a plaintiff who 
expends $5,000 on a lawsuit and loses would be required to pay an 
additional $5,000 to the court. Ephraim Fischbach and William 
McLauchlan characterize this rule as reverse-cost shifting “since the 
penalty levied against the losing side is determined by the expenditures 
of the losing side, rather than by the expenses of the winning side as 
under the [British] Rule.”111
The optimality of the RCS rule derives from its automatic 
application and strong settlement incentives that work in tandem to 
minimize the transaction costs arising from tort litigation. Procedurally, 
RCS corrects for the inefficiencies of the pro-prevailing plaintiff regime 
by (1) automatically levying a penalty on the losing party, and (2) fixing 
the size of the penalty through a rigid formula that resists judicial 
variance or modification. 112 Moreover, RCS only exposes litigants to a 
 108. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 70 (1970). 
 109. Fischbach & McLauchlan, supra note 11, at 39. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. at 42-44. For legal issues of first impression, or litigation in which the benefits 
take the form of a public good, the RCS rule might permit judges to waive the fee shift. However, 
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fee-shift as a function of their own knowable legal costs and intentionally 
divorces the penalty from their opponents’ unknowable expenditures. 
This “reverse-cost” element of the rule, initially introduced in a fee-
shifting proposal crafted by the President’s Council on Competitiveness 
(“PCC”),113 allows plaintiffs and defendants to accurately project their 
fee-shifting exposure. In the end, this feature not only minimizes 
transaction costs arising from imperfect information during the litigation 
process, but also “mitigate[s] the concern that a wealthy litigant could 
extort submission from an opponent by threatening to conduct a very 
costly legal campaign.”114
Substantively, the RCS rule facilitates litigation efficiency by closely 
tethering the parties to the merits of their case and increasing the 
incentives for parties to settle as trial expenses accumulate. Under RCS, 
a plaintiff who calculates his probability of victory to be below fifty 
percent at any point before or during the trial has strong incentives to 
either settle or forego a lawsuit entirely. Similarly, a defendant facing a 
high probability of defeat should offer to settle rather than increase his 
fee-shifting exposure by continuing to litigate. Thus, unlike the two 
paradigmatic rules and the pro-prevailing plaintiff scheme, RCS compels 
parties to constantly reevaluate the status of their case as the litigation 
continues and RCS exposure increases.115
In close cases, the parties’ conception of a “fair” settlement figure 
will ideally converge as a function of time and, ultimately, intersect at a 
damages figure that restores the plaintiff as nearly as possible to his pre-
injury position.116 Plaintiffs also have substantial disincentives to litigate 
cases where the probability of success is low and RCS exposure is 
correspondingly high. The RCS rule can also be tweaked to promote 
efficient outcomes even when the plaintiff is almost certain to prevail 
and, therefore, unwilling to engage in settlement discussions. To increase 
defendants’ leverage under these circumstances, the rule may be 
note that because the RCS Rule transfers fees to the court rather than the opposing party, an actual or 
anticipated waiver of the fee should not induce inefficient behavior by the opposing party, who does 
not stand to personally gain or lose by such a decision. 
 113. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 
IN AMERICA 24-25 (1991). 
 114. Bradley L. Smith, Note, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency Fees: Their 
Impact on Settlement Incentives, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2154, 2156 (1992). 
 115. The American Rule and the British Rule do not directly penalize parties as a function of 
their own litigation expenditures. Therefore, when the case commences parties will make a one-time 
determination of the probability of overcoming a summary judgment motion (under the American 
Rule) or prevailing in front of the jury (under the British Rule). A party that decides not to settle 
before the suit commences has little incentive under these fee-shifting rules to change their mind 
once the litigation begins. 
 116. See Elissa M. Meth, Note, Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution in 
Domestic and International Disputes, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 383, 384 (1999). 
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modified to impose an RCS penalty on the plaintiff (and absolve the 
defendant of any RCS fee shift) if the jury verdict is less than the 
defendant’s final settlement offer. 
The RCS rule also has the potential to single-handedly alleviate one 
of the more pernicious ills afflicting corporate America—the profligacy 
of class action lawsuits.  Recent amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, along with Congress’s enactment in February 
2005 of the Class Action Fairness Act,117 were motivated, at least in part, 
by the complaint of commercial defendants that the certification of a 
class action lawsuit empowered plaintiffs to extract unduly favorable 
settlements from defendants unwilling to risk a massive classwide 
damages verdict at trial.118 Thus, even parties defending against non-
meritorious claims are often coerced into settling to avoid the disastrous, 
if unlikely, scenario that the jury would find for the plaintiff.119
Once a class is certified, it is almost never economically feasible for 
the defendant to proceed to trial.120 Even so, the RCS rule could 
substantially level the playing field for defendants attempting to settle 
certified class actions by making the threat to go to trial a meaningful 
stick in settlement negotiations. Depending on the precise size of the 
class and the nature of the issues certified for class treatment, the cost of 
actually litigating a class action lawsuit can be astronomical, inducing a 
proportionally precipitous rise in the plaintiffs’ RCS penalty if they 
refuse to settle on appropriate terms and then lose at trial. 
As these examples illustrate, the elegance of the RCS rule derives 
not only from its underlying incentive structure, but also from its 
versatility as a template for tort reform. RCS is an amalgam of 
components—including inter alia the compensation factor, timing of 
penalty, and the legal significance of settlement offers—that lend 
themselves to legislative fine-tuning in response to litigation trends and 
further empirical study. If, for example, policymakers conclude that 
social efficiency gains from reduced “tort taxes” accrue from all pre-
 117. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). 
 118. See ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1272 (11th Cir. 2000) (“An order granting 
certification . . . may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action 
and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.”) (citing Advisory Committee Note, FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(f)). 
 119. See Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(observing the need for interlocutory appeals of orders certifying a class to provide a “mechanism 
through which appellate courts, in the interests of fairness, can restore equilibrium when a doubtful 
class certification ruling would virtually compel a party to abandon a potentially meritorious claim 
or defense before trial.”). Judge Friendly has referred to settlements induced by a small probability 
of an immense judgment in a class action “blackmail settlements.” HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973). 
 120. See Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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verdict settlements, they may wish to absolve parties of an RCS penalty 
no matter when they settle. If legislators target efficiency losses from the 
litigation process itself as an important goal of reform, they may opt for 
an RCS rule that imposes a reduced penalty if the parties eschew a pre-
trial settlement but ultimately resolve the case before the jury announces 
its verdict. So long as any variations are established by statute and 
applied automatically by courts, legislative refinement of the RCS rule 
will potentially confer substantial advantages over the more rigid 
American Rule and existing hybrids. 
The RCS rule offers important ancillary benefits by shifting the 
loser’s costs to the court rather than the opposing party.121 Shifting fees 
to the court as opposed to the winner ensures that the social efficiency 
gains from these transfers are not eroded by the sub-optimal primary 
behavior of parties expecting an attorney-fee windfall at trial. The court-
shifting requirement also reduces the magnitude of “psychic costs” that 
motivate parties to increase their own litigation expenses irrationally to 
avoid conferring a financial benefit on their opponent.122 Because 
litigation often incites animus in the emotionally charged realm of tort, a 
rule that shifts fees to a neutral party is most likely to encourage efficient 
behavior. Shifting fees to the court is also attractive insofar as it allocates 
financial responsibility for operating the civil justice system to the 
litigants who use it, and not to the taxpayers at large. Hence, it eliminates 
the taxpayers’ “public subsidization” of courts that artificially suppresses 
the cost to parties of engaging the judicial process.123
Finally, by imposing financial risk on parties who bring suit, the 
RCS rule indirectly mitigates the ills of contingency fee arrangements,124 
avoiding any need to confront this popular institution directly.125 Under 
RCS, a lawyer’s investment in his client’s case is no longer confined to 
his own time and resources but incorporates the risk of a financial 
penalty at the close of litigation. Fischbach and McLauchlin observe that 
“[s]ince an attorney may become responsible for his client’s penalty 
under the RCS rule, one effect of this rule is to bundle the interests of 
 121. Fischbach & McLauchlan, supra note 11, at 41. 
 122. See Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59, 
78 (1997). 
 123. See Stephen J. Choi, The Problem With Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1233, 1239 n.40 (2003) (noting that “[p]arties who choose to continue through the 
courts (at least in the [American system]) are subsidized to the extent they do not bear the full cost of 
operating the judicial system (including the salary of judges, among others)”). 
 124. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 567-74 (4th ed. 1992) 
(observing that contingency fee arrangements are criticized for encouraging non-meritorious 
litigation). 
 125. See Pfennigstorf, supra note 55 (discussing attorney practices in Europe that circumvent 
legal and ethical prohibitions on contingency fee arrangements). 
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attorneys and clients together.”126 Thus, the same disincentives to litigate 
imposed on parties are transferred to attorneys working under a 
contingency fee arrangement. Consequently, attorneys are likely to be 
more discriminating in the cases they accept on a contingency fee basis 
and may be particularly reluctant to assume the personal economic risk 
of litigating a frivolous or nuisance lawsuit on behalf of a non-paying 
client. To the extent that the plaintiff personally assumes responsibility 
for paying the RCS penalty, the rule will stimulate price competition 
among attorneys as clients seek to minimize their RCS exposure by 
finding attorneys who can limit litigation expenses. Thus, the RCS rule 
transforms the institution of contingency fee arrangements—historically 
criticized for encouraging attorney overreaching and litigation excess—
into a compelling incentive for lawyers to practice frugally. 
The RCS rule is also designed to encourage fair and rapid 
settlement.127 However, scholars do not unanimously agree that the legal 
system is well served by rules that deter parties from litigating.128 Critics 
of fee-shifting rules that encourage settlement claim that the legal system 
is robbed of opportunities to develop precedent, a trend that induces 
stagnation in the law over time. While an in-depth treatment of 
settlement theory is beyond the scope of this article, two points are worth 
emphasizing. Concededly, RCS may not be appropriate for blossoming 
areas of statutory law in which judges play an important role in clarifying 
ambiguities and adding flesh to skeletal legal standards. However, the 
marginal value of precedent to a tort system that absorbed the brunt of 
the litigation explosion is minimal.129 Second, the value of precedent is 
limited to litigation activity preceding the summary judgment phase, at 
which time the judge determines whether the plaintiff has argued a valid 
claim as a matter of law. The remainder of the trial, in which the parties 
dispute which version of the facts the jury should accept, has negligible 
value as precedent. Therefore, insofar as RCS encourages settlements 
between the summary judgment stage and the end of the trial, it offers 
significant advantages over competing alternatives. 
 
B.  A Game-Theory Illustration of Litigation Strategy under the 
American Rule and RCS 
 
As a new fee-shifting paradigm, RCS alters the financial calculus of 
both parties to a civil proceeding by introducing a penalty that is 
 126. Fischbach & McLauchlan, supra note 11, at 48. 
 127. See id. at 39-40. 
 128. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). 
 129. See generally OLSON, supra note 2. 
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inversely proportional to the strength of each party’s case. The effect of 
the RCS penalty on the strategies of the plaintiff and defendant can be 
modeled using game theory principles. By way of background, game 
theory is used extensively by economic and political theorists to model 
decision-making behaviors that involve the choice of a strategy.130 The 
“game” can be represented in graphical format by a simple grid that 
delineates the possible strategies of each participant and the 
consequences of each set of strategies, or strategy profile. 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma and a simple variant are useful tools for 
understanding the application of game theory to fee-shifting rules. The 
Prisoner’s Dilemma hypothesizes that two men (“Alvin” and “Bob”) are 
arrested for a crime they committed together.131 They are placed in 
separate rooms and interrogated. The questioners inform each prisoner 
that if they both plead guilty, they will each serve five years in prison. 
However, if they both plead innocent, each will spend only one year in 
jail. If one conspirator confesses and the other maintains his innocence, 
the confessor will be released as a reward for his cooperation while his 
partner serves ten years in prison. 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma can be expressed graphically in a two-by-
two matrix, where the first and second numbers in each strategy profile 
box represent Alvin and Bob’s “payoff,” respectively: 
                                                            
                                 Bob 
  Innocent Guilty 
Innocent -1,-1 -10,0 
Guilty 0,-10 -5,-5 
 
           Alvin 
 
 
Alvin and Bob’s decision-making process is analyzed by considering 
whether, given a particular position in the strategy matrix, a prisoner can 
improve his position by changing his answer, assuming that his co-
conspirator’s choice remains the same. Thus, if Alvin assumes that Bob 
will maintain his innocence, Alvin will spend a year in jail if he also 
pleads innocent, but will be released outright if he confesses his guilt. On 
the other hand, if Alvin predicts that Bob will plead guilty, Alvin will 
spend ten years in prison if he pleads innocent, but just five years if he 
admits his guilt. Therefore, Alvin benefits by admitting his guilt 
regardless of whether he assumes Bob will confess or maintain his 
innocence. 
 130. See generally DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY (1991); MORTON D. 
DAVIS & LANGDON DAVIS, GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL INTRODUCTION (1997). 
 131. See generally WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA (1992). 
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Since the payoffs in this scenario are identical for Alvin and Bob, the 
same reasoning applies to Bob as well. Thus, the strategy profile [Guilty, 
Guilty] is an equilibrium position. Indeed, this is a Nash equilibrium, a 
position from which no player benefits from changing his strategy, 
assuming the other prisoner’s strategy remain the same.132 Since the 
strategy profile [Guilty, Guilty] is the only Nash equilibrium133 in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the dominant strategy134 for each player is to 
confess. 
In the early stages of a tort litigation, the plaintiff and defendant 
choose whether to settle their dispute or proceed with litigation. This 
decision can be modeled with a strategy matrix similar to the matrix used 
to represent the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Consider a hypothetical products 
liability lawsuit: Jones v. Garrity Auto Parts (“Garrity”). The brakes on 
Jones’s car failed, causing an accident in which Jones sustained minor 
injuries. We initially examine Garrity under the American Rule, 
employing three assumptions about the costs incurred during this tort 
proceeding. First, both parties incur a legal fee of $30,000 for a 
settlement and $60,000 for litigation. Second, if Jones is victorious, his 
judgment will be in the amount of $300,000. Third, Garrity offers a 
settlement amount that varies with the strength of Jones’s case, but is 
capped at $200,000. 
We now analyze Jones’s decision matrix in three scenarios—where 
the probabilities of a favorable judgment are 25 percent, 50 percent, and 
75 percent To calculate the payoffs for each strategy profile, we multiply 
the amount of the judgment or settlement by its probability of occurring 
andthen subtract legal fees.135 Note that the payoffs for the strategy 
profiles [Litigate, Settle] and [Settle, Litigate] are equivalent to [Litigate, 
Litigate] because the option to settle is feasible only if both parties agree:
 132. See FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 130, at 11-14. 
 133. See id. 
 134. A strategy is dominant if it always leads to a higher payoff for one player, regardless of 
the other player’s choice. In the prisoner’s dilemma, if Bob claims innocence, Alvin would admit 
guilt (0) rather than plead innocent (-1). If Bob confesses, Alvin would admit guilt (-5) rather than 
plead innocent (-10).  The same logic works for Bob’s decision. Therefore, admitting guilt is the 
dominant strategy, and claiming innocence is said to be a dominated strategy. See id. at 6-9. 
 135. Calculations have been rounded to the nearest ten, and the numbers represent thousands 
of dollars. See Appendix A for a detailed description of the calculations. 
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                                                                Jones (75%) 
  Litigate Settle 
Litigate -290,170 (-290,170) 
Settle (-290,170) -180,120 
 
Garrity (25%) 
 
 
                               Jones (50%) 
 
 Litigate Settle 
Litigate -210,90 (-210,90) 
Settle (-210,90) -130,70 
 
Garrity (50%) 
 
 
                             Jones (25%) 
  Litigate Settle 
Litigate -140,20 (-140,20) 
Settle (-140,20) -80,20 
Garrity (75%) 
 
 
 
 Under the American Rule, Jones stands to receive a larger payoff by 
litigating than settling until his probability of a favorable judgment falls 
below 25 percent. Therefore, his dominant strategy will be to litigate all 
but the weakest cases. However, note that litigation is always an 
inefficient136 option for both parties collectively, in that the total cost of 
litigation (the sum of both payoffs in a strategy profile) is higher than the 
cost of settlement. 
Now consider a variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which we term 
the “Plea Bargain Scenario”.  In this game, if one conspirator pleads 
guilty and the other pleads innocent, the party that confesses receives a 
two-year prison sentence instead of his outright release. This game more 
closely models prevailing practice in the criminal justice system, where 
prosecutors use plea bargains to reward co-conspirators with reduced—
but not negligible—sentences in return for cooperation. The Plea Bargain 
Scenario will have different payoffs than the Prisoner’s Dilemma for the 
[Innocent, Guilty] and [Guilty, Innocent] strategy profiles: 
 
                     Bob 
  Innocent Guilty 
Innocent -1,-1 -10,-2 
Guilty -2,-10 -5,-5 
Alvin 
 136. In this context, we can think of efficiency as a measure of the total cost of settling a 
dispute, which is the sum of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s costs. Therefore, the most efficient 
outcome is the one in which the total cost is minimized.
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This new rule has an important consequence. If Alvin thinks Bob 
will plead innocent, then Alvin is better off following suit, and vice 
versa. As a result, admitting guilt is no longer the dominant strategy of 
each player. Instead, Alvin’s choice of strategy depends on how likely he 
thinks Bob is to claim innocence, and vice versa. 
Returning to Jones v. Garrity, we can now appreciate how the 
behavior of each party would change under the RCS Rule. Just as the 
Plea Bargain Scenario modifies the strategy profiles of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, RCS introduces an analogous penalty that eliminates the 
dominance of the litigation strategy under the American Rule. In order to 
calculate the new payoffs/penalties for each strategy profile, we simply 
introduce a probability-adjusted fee-shifting penalty incurred by 
litigating parties. This penalty, which is equal to the party’s own legal 
costs, is incurred by the party that loses a lawsuit. Therefore, Jones and 
Garrity will each multiply their probability of losing the case by the 
amount of this penalty and factor the resultant cost into his respective 
decision: 
 
                                    Jones (75%) 
  Litigate Settle 
Litigate -330,150 (-330,150) 
Settle (-330,150) -180,120 
 
Garrity (25%) 
 
 
                                    Jones (50%) 
 Litigate Settle 
Litigate -240,60 (-240,60) 
Settle (-240,60) -130,70 
 
Garrity (50%) 
 
 
                                   Jones (25%) 
 
 Litigate Settle 
Litigate -150,-30 (-150,-30) 
Settle (-150,-30) -80,20 
Garrity (75%) 
 
 
 
Under RCS, the payoffs/penalties remain the same for the strategy 
profile [Settle, Settle]. However, three favorable consequences are 
evident. First, Jones no longer receives a higher payoff for litigating a 
case with a 50 percent or lower probability of favorable judgment. In 
other words, RCS has eliminated the plaintiff’s dominant strategy of 
litigating cases with questionable merit. Indeed, under RCS, Jones 
actually stands to lose money by attempting to litigate a case with less 
than a 33 percent probability of a favorable outcome. Second, the fee-
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shifting penalty makes litigation a less favorable option for both parties 
in all circumstances, demonstrating that RCS even-handedly encourages 
an efficient settlement. Third, when one party has a 75 percent 
probability of winning, the range of payoffs/penalties is wider under 
RCS than the American Rule, which means that the plaintiff enjoys a 
particular advantage when his case has strong merit and vice versa. This 
illustrates that in unbalanced civil disputes, RCS tilts the playing field in 
favor of the party with the stronger case. 
A more complex analysis would reveal further benefits of RCS. 
Since Jones still stands to receive a higher payoff by litigating a case 
with a 75 percent chance of a favorable outcome, Garrity would probably 
offer a higher initial settlement, since he would lose an additional 
$40,000 (compared to the American Rule) if the case goes to trial. 
Likewise, if Jones’s case is weak, he would be encouraged to accept a 
lower initial settlement offer to avoid a fee-shifting penalty at trial. 
Therefore, the settlement reached under RCS would be more efficient 
than the costly trials so common under the American Rule and more 
even-handed than the pro-prevailing plaintiff settlements reached under 
state fee-shifting statutes. 
Further game theoretic analyses of tort strategies under the American 
Rule and RCS could make use of an extensive-form model,137 which 
would introduce a temporal element to the game analyzed above. Such 
an analysis could demonstrate how the RCS penalty would encourage the 
parties to engage in iterative rounds of offers and counteroffers, ideally 
converging on a settlement figure that reflects the actual injury suffered 
by the plaintiff. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Legislators predictably reacted to the litigation explosion by 
combining elements of the American Rule and the British Rule in an 
attempt to discourage frivolous litigation and ensure that all plaintiffs 
with meritorious cases could feasibly access the judicial system. 
However, the preoccupation of state legislators with ensuring justice on a 
case-by-case basis led to the establishment of fee-shifting rules that 
granted excessive discretion to judges and institutionalized a preference 
for prevailing plaintiffs over prevailing defendants. These rules were 
initially designed by Congress to enforce newly created federal statutory 
rights by encouraging plaintiffs to vindicate those rights in court. Not 
surprisingly, inefficiencies arose as state legislators applied this federal 
 137. The games analyzed here are represented in strategic-form, in which both parties choose 
their strategies simultaneously, without knowing what the other party has chosen. 
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model to older and more established state common law rights of action, 
leading reformers to explore alternate fee-shifting schemes that 
incorporated a more global view of efficiency while preserving fairness 
for individual litigants. 
The RCS rule evades the pitfalls of prior state efforts by establishing 
an even-handed two-way fee-shifting system that allocates the costs of 
legal uncertainty equally to both sides. RCS fundamentally diverges from 
earlier rules by laboring at the opposite end of the litigation pipeline to 
preserve fairness through the creation of disincentives to non-meritorious 
parties rather than incentives to plaintiffs generally. RCS further protects 
society by limiting the vulnerability of defendants to non-meritorious 
lawsuits, thereby minimizing the price distortions to commodities 
ranging from medical care to sports equipment that result from the flow 
of settlement surpluses to plaintiffs. By steering parties toward a fair 
settlement, RCS redefines optimality in the tort system as efficiency.  In 
the final analysis, while there may be no talismanic solution to America’s 
litigation explosion, RCS may be a crucial first-step toward recasting the 
role of litigation in balancing the pursuit of individual redress and the 
maximization of social welfare. 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
I.   VARIABLES 
 
Cs = legal costs for settlement 
 
Ct = legal costs for litigation 
 
Pp = probability of favorable judgment for plaintiff 
 
Pd = 1 − Pp = probability of favorable judgment for defendant 
 
J = judgment for plaintiff 
 
S = defendant’s maximum settlement offer 
 
F = RCE fee-shifting fraction 
 
II.  AMERICAN RULE 
 
Litigate, Litigate = (−Ct − Pp J), (−Ct + Pp J) 
 
Settle, Settle = (−Cs − Pp S), (−Cs + Pp S) 
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III. RCE 
 
Litigate, Litigate = (−Ct − PpJ − PpFCt), (−Ct + PpJ − (1-Pp)FCt) 
 
Settle, Settle = (−Cs − Pp S), (−Cs + Pp S) 
